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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a great privilege to participate in this collection of essays in honour
of Justice Thomas A. Cromwell, who has been both mentor and friend to
me over the years — and who, when as a junior lawyer I had the pleasure
of appearing before him, was also a singularly formidable judge. It is well
worth remembering in the context of this collection that prior to his stellar
career as a jurist, Cromwell J. was a much-loved professor of law at
Dalhousie Law School. This was in no small part because he was so
effective at conveying to students the importance of clarity of thought,
rigour of analysis and consistent methodology, particularly in the shaping
of the common law and in statutory interpretation. As a judge, many of
what I would call his finest moments were in evidence and procedure,
areas sometimes called “lawyer’s law”, where these qualities were at their
most critical. While on the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, he made wellregarded decisions in areas such as hearsay1 and witness immunity,2 while
as a Justice of the Supreme Court he issued leading judgments on, inter
alia, expert opinion.3 In all of these areas, his focus was on identifying the
policy goals to be accomplished, analyzing the law properly and ultimately
delivering an analytical framework for use by lawyers and the lower courts
so that the goals could be properly achieved.

Professor of Law, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. Thanks are due to
Hugh Kindred & Phillip Saunders for comments on an earlier draft, and to Anne-Marie Delorey
(LL.M. Dalhousie, 2018 (anticipated)) for her research assistance.
1
R. v. Wilcox, [2001] N.S.J. No. 85, 2001 NSCA 45 (N.S.C.A.).
2
Elliott v. Insurance Crime Prevention Bureau, [2005] N.S.J. No. 323, 2005 NSCA 115
(N.S.C.A.).
3
White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., [2015] S.C.J. No. 23, 2015
SCC 23 (S.C.C.).
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Justice Cromwell’s contributions to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in
the area of public international law were much less frequent than to other
areas; over the course of his tenure he participated in 19 cases that raised
questions of international law, but issued written reasons in only five: Németh
v. Canada (Justice),4 Gavrila v. Canada (Justice),5 Peracomo Inc. v. TELUS
Communications Co.,6 Thibodeau v. Air Canada,7 and M.M. v. United States
of America.8 Three of these cases (Németh, Gavrila and M.M.) arose from
extradition proceedings involving individuals who claimed that their
surrender to the requesting state would produce unfair results and violate their
rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.9 More important
for present purposes, however, is that each of these cases required
engagement not only with public international law per se — specifically,
international treaties — but with the difficult exercise of analyzing how
treaties are implemented and applied by Canadian statutes and, to some
extent, how Charter analysis should take account of international law.
All five of these cases, in my view, show Cromwell J. as a formidable
wielder of the legal methodology involved in the treaty-statute matrix.
Németh, in particular, was both the first and most interesting of these. It
brought public international law issues to the forefront of extradition
proceedings10 because it involved potential conflicts between Canada’s
obligations under extradition treaties and its obligations under the
Refugee Convention.11 In particular, the case raised the issue of how the
two pieces of legislation which implement each of these obligations were
meant to interact. On a broader level, it involved a clash of legal policy
areas, the crime control rationale of extradition colliding with the human
rights protections embodied in the international law regarding protection
of refugees. And it propelled the Supreme Court into a complex area of
law in which it has not always been successful in laying out, or adhering
to, clear doctrine.
4

[2010] S.C.J. No. 56, 2010 SCC 56 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Németh”].
[2010] S.C.J. No. 57, 2010 SCC 57 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gavrila”].
6
[2014] S.C.J. No. 29, 2014 SCC 29 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Peracomo”].
7
[2014] S.C.J. No. 67, 2014 SCC 67 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Thibodeau”].
8
[2015] S.C.J. No. 62, 2015 SCC 62 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “M.M.”].
9
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”]. Justice Cromwell
also wrote a fairly lengthy and interesting extradition decision while on the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal: see R. v. MacIntosh, [2008] N.S.J. No. 585, 2008 NSCA 124 (N.S.C.A.).
10
While Gavrila was the companion case to, and involved the same issue as, Németh, in
that case Cromwell J. simply applied the framework he set out in Németh.
11
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Can. T.S. 1969 No. 6 (as amended by the
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Can. T.S. 1969 No. 29).
5
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Unsurprisingly to those who know him, Cromwell J. was up to the task
in Németh, and indeed in all five of his international law decisions. The
modest goal of this piece is to argue that Cromwell J., in bringing to the
public international law area his “lawyer’s law” approach — that is to say,
his characteristic intellectual rigour underpinned by powerful procedural
fairness impulses — has shored up the Supreme Court’s international law
methodology and left the Court’s jurisprudence in better shape than he
found it. The primary focus will be on Németh as the best expository
example, with references as necessary to Peracomo and Thibodeau.12

II. WALKING THROUGH THE MINEFIELD: USING PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law is part of the law of Canada.13 Lawyers are ethically
bound to argue it in the same way they advance domestic law arguments,
and judges are entitled to take judicial notice of it. Canada is a participant
in a large number of international law regimes, and in a highly globalized
world it is safe to say that there is more international law than ever,
addressing a wide array of subject matter. The result is that international
law — and the ability to use international law methodology — is more
important than it ever was. Yet it is a highly discrete and specialized area
with which Canadian practitioners and judges are often not familiar, the
result of which is that international law that is relevant to particular cases
is subject to being used incorrectly, or even ignored. The most difficult
12
Justice Cromwell’s judgment in M.M., while it represents an interesting contribution to
the Court’s extradition jurisprudence, contains no real attention to the treaty-statute interface; as is
not unusual for Canadian courts in extradition cases, Cromwell J. was content to state that, “The
Extradition Act implements, through domestic law, Canada’s international obligations to surrender
persons found here so that they will face prosecution, or serve sentences imposed, in another
country” (at para. 14). Németh notwithstanding, the Court’s consistent inattention to relevant
international law and practice in its extradition jurisprudence — particularly that relating to
international human rights law — is an engaging topic, though not one upon which I will dwell here;
but see Robert J. Currie & Joseph Rikhof, International & Transnational Criminal Law, 2d ed.
(Toronto: Irwin, 2013), at 531-44; Joanna Harrington, “The Role for Human Rights Obligations in
Canadian Extradition Law” (2005) 43 Cdn. Yb. Int’l L. 45; Robert J. Currie & Joanna Harrington,
“Prosecuting Crime at Home Secures Respect for Human Rights” The Court.ca (September 12,
2016), online: <http://www.thecourt.ca/prosecuting-crime-home-secures-respect-human-rights-2/>.
13
On this topic generally, see Gibran Van Ert, Using International Law in Canadian
Courts, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) [hereinafter “Van Ert”]; Hugh M. Kindred, Phillip M.
Saunders & Robert J. Currie, eds., International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada,
8th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2014), c. 3 [hereinafter “Kindred et al.”]; William A.
Schabas & Stephane Beaulac, International Human Rights and Canadian Law: Legal Commitment,
Implementation and the Charter, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2007); Currie & Rikhof, id., at 31-44.
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point is that which is often referred to as “incorporation” or “reception”,
by which is meant the process of how international legal rules which are
made between and among states become part of the law of Canada.
Over the years, the Supreme Court of Canada has given the lower
courts guidance on how to ascertain whether and how international law
norms have become part of Canadian law. The most difficult area is that
of treaties. These interstate agreements often bring with them
requirements for party states to modify existing domestic laws, or at least
to ensure particular domestic laws are in place, in order for the states to
comply with the obligations contained in the treaties. For its part, Canada
has a “dualist” approach to treaties, meaning that treaty obligations are
not automatically incorporated into our law but must be “transformed”
into law by way of implementation via statute.14 In terms of whether and
how Canada is bound under the treaty as a matter of international law,
variations in the manner of implementation make for a distinction
without much of a difference. That is to say, Canada is equally bound
whether (1) the federal Parliament or a provincial legislature passes a
statute that is expressly designed to implement a treaty (“An Act to
Implement Treaty X”)15 or (2) the treaty provisions are “not addressed by
specific legislation because the Department of Justice has determined
that the existing law of Canada, federal and/or provincial, is sufficient to
fulfill them”.16
This latter distinction is significant in Canadian law because the
Supreme Court of Canada has established a hierarchy between
“implemented” treaties and “unimplemented” treaties. The former status
will only be found to exist where there is some clear and manifest
expression of legislative intention to implement the treaty.17 The result is
that implemented treaties will be presumptively given full force and effect,
treated as fully part of the law of Canada, and statutes will be presumed to
conform with the treaty obligations absent express Parliamentary intent to
the contrary.18 “Unimplemented” treaties, by contrast, are treated as
essentially not part of Canadian law, despite their binding effect
internationally and despite the fact that Canada’s laws may functionally
14

See, generally, Kindred et al., id., at 171.
A good example is the Civil International Space Station Agreement Implementation Act,
S.C. 1999, c. 35.
16
Kindred et al., supra, note 13, at 192.
17
MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd., [1976] S.C.J. No. 60, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.).
18
R. v. Hape, [2007] S.C.J. No. 26, 2007 SCC 26, at paras. 53-54 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Hape”]; Van Ert, supra, note 13, at 161-81.
15
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meet their requirements, but rather as interpretive context for statutes to
which they may be relevant;19 as LeBel J. put it in R. v. Hape:
[T]he legislature is presumed to comply with the values and principles
of customary and conventional international law. Those values and
principles form part of the context in which statutes are enacted, and
courts will therefore prefer a construction that reflects them.20

This methodological matrix has been at its most controversial when
dealing with treaties containing international human rights norms. The
Charter, as part of the supreme law of the land, tends to be carefully
and restrictively handled by the Supreme Court. While international
law commitments have always been used as “a persuasive source for
interpreting the scope of the Charter”,21 human rights treaties tend to be
treated as unimplemented nonetheless, decidedly blunting their strength
in the overall interpretive exercise. The danger of the “values and
principles” approach is frequently made manifest, as the Court will
often employ a mixture of “international legal materials” — which
might include treaties to which Canada is not even party — as part of
an overall “contextual” approach to interpreting the Charter.22 This
approach puts the cart well before the horse in the sense that
interpreting Canadian law alongside a particular international law
obligation should logically start with an assessment of the obligation
itself and the scope and extent of how Canada is bound by it.23
19
This approach in its modern form emerged from Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.). There, L’Heureux-Dubé J.
considered the impact of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3.
Although this treaty had been ratified by Canada and had a direct impact on many areas of Canadian law,
the Court treated it as “unimplemented” and, thus, relegated it to a “values and principles”-based place in
the interpretation of the then-Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2.
20
Hape, supra, note 18, at para. 53.
21
Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, 2007 SCC 27, at para. 78 (S.C.C.).
22
See, e.g., Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney
General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 2004 SCC 4 (S.C.C.) and United States of America v. Burns, [2001]
S.C.J. No. 8, 2001 SCC 7 (S.C.C.).
23
The case of Amaratunga v. Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, [2013] S.C.J.
No. 66, 2013 SCC 66 (S.C.C.) is a particularly egregious example of this sort of unclear analysis,
both in the Supreme Court’s judgment and in the judgment of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
below: Amaratunga v. Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, [2011] N.S.J. No. 453, 2011
NSCA 73 (N.S.C.A.). Specifically, rather than determining the international law rule and then
interpreting the relevant statute in light of it, each level of court used a mixture of international
sources — including the relevant treaty but also a variety of other, sometimes tangentially related,
treaties, case law and instruments — as a touchstone for interpreting the statute, without first asking
itself what Canada’s international law obligation actually was.
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Criticism of the Court in this regard has been as exasperated as it is
distinguished.24

III. THE CASES
Against this backdrop, Cromwell J.’s treaty law judgments, particularly
that in Németh, collectively represent a significant contribution to the
jurisprudence. While he did not complete a revolutionary change of the
Court’s overall methodology, his incisive approach to using treaty law in
the process of statutory interpretation is something of a master class in
making sense of things as they currently stand.
In Németh, the two claimants were Hungarians of Roma ethnicity
who had been granted refugee status in Canada in 2001 due to their wellfounded fear of persecution based on their ethnic origin. However, two
years later Hungary sought their extradition to face prosecution on a
minor fraud charge,25 and the Minister of Justice eventually ordered their
surrender, which order was upheld by the Quebec Court of Appeal.26 The
appellants argued that Canada was obliged under article 33 of the
Refugee Convention not to send them back to their country of origin
where they would face persecution (the obligation of non-refoulement),
so long as they were refugees under Canadian law. The Crown argued
that Canada was obliged to fulfil Hungary’s extradition request, and that
individuals who had refugee status could nonetheless be extradited, given
the Refugee Convention’s exception allowing refoulement of refugees
who were charged with a serious non-political crime; moreover, the
appellants had not proven that they would be subject to persecution in
Hungary upon their return.
While the particulars of Németh are described below, of interest here
is the analytical process Cromwell J. used in this first treaty law
judgment. Though it occurs midway through the earlier part of the
decision, the methodological structure laid out by Cromwell J., almost in
passing, imposes some amount of clarity on the use of treaty law:
24
See John H. Currie, “International Human Rights Law in the Supreme Court’s Charter
Jurisprudence: Commitment, Retrenchment and Retreat — In No Particular Order” (2010) 50
S.C.L.R. (2d) 423; Hugh M. Kindred, “The Use and Abuse of International Legal Sources by
Canadian Courts: Searching for a Principled Approach” in Oonagh Fitzgerald, ed., The Globalised
Rule of Law; Relationships Between International and Domestic Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006).
25
Allegedly the appellants had sold a right of lease for premises in Budapest that they did
not own, making approximately CDN $2,700: Németh, supra, note 4, at para. 5.
26
[2009] Q.J. No. 271, 2009 QCCA 99 (Que. C.A.).
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I also accept, of course, that where possible statutes should be
interpreted in a way which makes their provisions consistent with
Canada’s international treaty obligations and principles of international
law. As LeBel J. noted in R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R.
292, at para. 53, it is presumed that the legislature acts in compliance
with Canada’s obligations as a signatory of international treaties and as
a member of the international community as well as in conformity with
the values and principles of customary and conventional international
law: see also, for example, Zingre v. The Queen, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 392,
at pp. 409-10; Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437, at para. 137;
Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2
S.C.R. 817, at para. 70; and Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General),
2002 SCC 62, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 269, at para. 50.
The presumption that legislation implements Canada’s international
obligations is rebuttable. If the provisions are unambiguous, they must
be given effect: see, e.g., Schreiber, at para. 50.27

This is a simple and elegant statement of the current state of the
Court’s view on how treaty obligations are properly cognized in domestic
Canadian law. Its content is not revolutionary, as is clear from the
volume of case law that Cromwell J. stitched together and, in particular,
in that it mostly restated the relevant principles as they had been laid out
in the Court’s 2007 decision in Hape.28 However, in Hape these
statements of law were in the way of obiter dicta because the
international law in question in that case was customary rather than
treaty-based. Moreover, LeBel J.’s judgment was one of three separate
opinions (including a slightly different methodology adopted by
Bastarache J. in his separate concurring reasons). While this passage
does not resolve the tension regarding the use of “unimplemented”
treaties described above, it certainly “carefully delineates the varying
status and attendant interpretive consequences of the different sources”29
of international law in a coherent and helpful manner.
It is worthy of note that Cromwell J. applied these particular
principles nicely in Thibodeau, in which the issue was whether the
appellants could receive an award in damages against Air Canada for
breaches of the Official Languages Act,30 when such awards against

27
28
29
30

Németh, supra, note 4, at paras. 34, 35.
Hape, supra, note 18.
Kindred et al., supra, note 13, at 196.
R.S.C. 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp.).
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airlines were barred by the Montreal Convention31 as implemented by the
Carriage by Air Act.32 One of the appellants’ main arguments was that
the two statutes were in conflict because the Official Languages Act
contained broad and general wording allowing courts to award such
remedies as were “appropriate and just” and thus overrode the Montreal
Convention. Invoking the presumption of conformity, Cromwell J. turned
this argument on its head: given that Parliament was presumed not to
legislate in violation of Canada’s treaty obligations, the Official
Languages Act was properly seen as having been enacted within an
overall legislative context that included adherence to these obligations.
Surely, he reasoned, a remedy which placed Canada in breach — and
absent explicit Parliamentary intention to do so — was not consistent
with what was “appropriate and just”.33
Writing for a unanimous nine-justice bench in Németh, Cromwell J.
tackled an array of interesting problems. The primary issue he boiled
down with characteristic incisiveness to a clash of both treaty obligations
and the statutes by which they were implemented:
These two obligations in relation to non-refoulement and extradition
may collide … when Canada is faced with a request to extradite
refugees to a state which they fled to avoid persecution. …
The resolution of the appeal requires an interpretation of the
Extradition Act … and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act …
that reconciles the competing obligations in relation to extradition and
non-refoulement.34

Justice Cromwell confronted two diametrically opposed arguments
from the parties, both of which were concerned with how international
law obligations were reflected in the implementing statutes. The
appellants argued that the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,35 as
the implementation vehicle for the Refugee Convention, was a complete
code regarding refugees. Section 115 of the IRPA, which implemented
article 33 of the Convention, was thus the governing rule. Given that it
barred the application of the Extradition Act,36 the appellants could not
31
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, 2242
U.N.T.S. 309.
32
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26.
33
Thibodeau, supra, note 7, at paras. 90, 114.
34
Németh, supra, note 4, at paras. 1, 3.
35
S.C. 2001, c. 27 [hereinafter “IRPA”].
36
S.C. 1999, c. 18.
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be sent back to Hungary while they still had refugee status. The Crown,
on the other hand, argued that to the extent the non-refoulement
obligation was engaged in an extradition proceeding it was properly
addressed under the Extradition Act. This meant that the Minister of
Justice would exercise his ordinary powers under that legislation,
including the various mandatory and discretionary bars of surrender.
In the final result, Cromwell J. accepted the primary point of the
Crown’s argument — that non-refoulement regarding extradition was
properly dealt with under the Extradition Act. He decided, however, that
the Minister had used incorrect legal principles in determining whether
he was barred from ordering surrender in this case.37
In the judgment itself, Cromwell J. began by noting that nonrefoulement lies “[a]t the heart of the protections accorded to refugees
under the Refugee Convention” and that state parties to the treaty cannot
make reservations to it.38 The Convention is explicitly implemented by
section 115 of the IRPA, which is “a statutory expression of the principle
of non-refoulement”.39 This was clear from a close comparison of the
wording of the section with article 33 and also from a comparison of the
exceptions to section 115 with the exclusions from refugee status and
grounds for expulsion of refugees under articles 1F and 32, respectively,
of the Convention.40 It was also clear that, in international law, the
protection of refugees against refoulement applies to extradition much as
it does to any other form of expulsion, which reflected the Convention’s
“obvious human rights purpose” and was a point on which
“commentators are unanimous”.41
Importantly, however, section 115 applied to “removal” of refugees
under the IRPA, and careful analysis of the statute revealed that
“removal” was intended to be a term of art referring specifically to
immigration and refugee administrative processes. While in principle
“removal” was a broad enough term to encompass extradition, in context
it referred only to the procedures set out in the IRPA. This interpretation
was underscored by the fact that the IRPA expressly dealt with the
interplay between removal and extradition in some instances, but did not
deal expressly with the extradition of refugees. Justice Cromwell held
that while not applying the non-refoulement obligation to extradition
37
38
39
40
41

Németh, supra, note 4, at para. 115.
Id., at para. 18.
Id., at para. 22.
Id., at para. 23.
Id., at para. 33.
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would certainly put Canada in breach of it, it was neither intended by
Parliament nor required that section 115 be treated as the statutory
implementation of the international law rule. Rather, that authority was to
be found in section 44 of the Extradition Act.42 Though the appellants
had argued that refugee status was determinative on the point of whether
the individual could be extradited (i.e., so long as the person had refugee
status under the IRPA they could not be considered for extradition to
their home state), Cromwell J. noted that there was no support for this in
either international law or relevant state practice under the Convention
— what was determinative was whether the claimant faced a risk of
being persecuted at the time that extradition was contemplated, and
nothing turned on whether the claimant’s refugee status had been set
aside under the domestic refugee law regime.43
Justice Cromwell went on to determine, as noted, that the intention of
Parliament had been to implement article 33 of the Refugee Convention
by way of the Extradition Act, specifically section 44(1)(b) of that Act,
which provides:
44. (1) The Minister shall refuse to make a surrender order if the
Minister is satisfied that:
…..
(b) the request for extradition is made for the purpose of prosecuting
or punishing the person by reason of their race, religion, nationality,
ethnic origin, language, colour, political opinion, sex, sexual
orientation, age, mental or physical disability or status or that the
person’s position may be prejudiced for any of those reasons.

At the heart of the appellants’ argument was the notion that it would
be counterintuitive for an extradition statute to implement one of the
primary obligations under the international law relating to the protection
of refugees. However, Cromwell J. compellingly argued that this was
clear “not only from the text of the section, but also from its origins and
the debates and hearings at the time of its adoption”.44 His analytical
roadmap began with article 3(2) of the 1957 European Convention on
Extradition,45 which “stipulates mandatory reasons for refusal of
extradition based on non-refoulement as set out in Article 33(1) of the
42
43
44
45

Id., at para. 35.
Id., at paras. 49-52.
Id., at para. 77.
Eur. T.S. 1957 No. 24.
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Refugee Convention”46 and was intended to protect refugees in the
extradition context. This provision had itself been adopted in the
United Nations’ Model Treaty on Extradition.47 It was easy to tell that
section 44(1)(b) of the Extradition Act had been inspired by these texts
given the similarity of the wording used,48 to the point that it was “clear
that it was directed to the same purpose as the comparable provision …
fulfilling non-refoulement obligations in the extradition context”.49 There
was also strong evidence in the Parliamentary record regarding the
introduction of the Extradition Act that this had been the intention of the
drafters of the Act and the federal government.50
However, despite the fact that an apparent refugee law protection was
implemented via the Extradition Act, for Cromwell J. it was clear that the
section should not become unmoored from international refugee law
entirely for the purposes of interpretation and application. Given the
refugee-law-based “overarching and clear human rights object and
purpose” of the provision, section 44(1)(b) “when applied to the situation
of a refugee whose extradition is sought, must be understood in the full
context of refugee protection”.51 This had two important procedural
implications.
First, understood in light of the Refugee Convention’s wording and
both persuasive commentary and state practice (by way of court
decisions from other states),52 “a person entitled to refugee protection in
Canada and therefore protection against refoulement is entitled to
protection under s. 44(1)(b)”.53
Second, in this case the Minister had placed on the appellants the
burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that persecution would
occur in order for them to successfully invoke the surrender bar in
section 44(1)(b). On the question of whether this was appropriate,
Cromwell J. succinctly tracked his way through the international law on
the question of when individuals are entitled to refugee status. He noted
that while the law allows states to revoke or refuse refugee status once
relevant circumstances have changed in the state of origin, “[i]t is widely
46

Németh, supra, note 4, at para. 78.
United Nations General Assembly, Model
Doc. A/RES/45/116 (1990).
48
Németh, supra, note 4, at para. 81.
49
Id.
50
Id., at paras. 47-48, 83-85.
51
Id., at para. 86.
52
Id., at paras. 99-101.
53
Id., at para. 102.
47

Treaty

on

Extradition,

U.N.
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accepted that the state bears the burden of proof that refugee status
previously recognized should be terminated” on this basis.54 Given that
non-refoulement protection is “co-extensive with the entitlement to
refugee protection”,55 it made sense that the burden of proof should
similarly lie on the state to demonstrate that extradition would not offend
non-refoulement on the basis that conditions in the state of origin had
changed. This was also commensurate with how other IRPA-based
processes operated. He concluded on this point:
Thus, the obligations under the Refugee Convention and the analogy to the
cessation and revocation provisions under the IRPA suggest that, under
s. 44(1)(b) of the EA, a refugee should not have to establish at the
surrender phase that the conditions which lead to conferring refugee status,
and thus to non-refoulement protection, continue to exist. This approach
also seems to me to be both practical and fair. It gives some weight, but not
binding force, to the earlier conclusion that refugee protection was justified.
It also prevents placing a burden on a person sought that he or she is not
well placed to discharge. Consider the present case. It does not to me seem
either fair or practical to require the appellants to establish current
conditions in Hungary, a country from which they have been absent for six
years. Both the Minister, through consultation with the MCI, and the
requesting state are much better placed to come forward with evidence of
changed conditions than is the refugee whose extradition is sought.56

In the result, the matter had to be remitted for reconsideration: having
based the decision on section 44(1)(a), the Minister had not turned his
mind to the application of section 44(1)(b) of the Extradition Act in
reaching his surrender decision, and had placed improperly onerous
burdens on the appellants.

IV. THE RESULT: METHODOLOGY AND PRACTICALITY
The above short and deliberately selective summary of Cromwell J.’s
decision in Németh, highlighting as it did the international law aspects of the
case, does not do justice to the exhaustive and detailed exercise in statutory
interpretation it represents. Most relevant here is the principled and
methodologically sound manner in which he incorporated international law
norms into the analysis, in all three of these treaty cases.
54
55
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Id., at para. 109.
Id., at para. 108.
Id., at para. 111.
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There are three aspects of Németh which make it, in particular, a
significant contribution to the jurisprudence. First is the solidification of
the manner in which the Court deals with incorporating treaty obligations
into statutory interpretation, as described above. This point is also
reflected in both Peracomo and Thibodeau, in each of which Cromwell J.
began his analysis by ascertaining what was intended by the framers of
the treaties in question, informed by textual interpretation in light of
relevant doctrine (discussed further below), and then turning to
interpretation of the relevant statute in light of the obligation. Admittedly
in all three cases, this exercise was made easier by the fact that the
judgment dealt primarily with treaties that had been fully implemented
by statute and thus did not need to confront the problem of
“unimplemented” treaties. However, it was no small matter that in
Németh Cromwell J. was able to rationalize the extradition obligation
with the non-refoulement obligation by finding the latter to be
implemented in the Extradition Act, despite the lack of express
legislative intention in this regard. His use of the drafting records of
various relevant international instruments, as well as the Parliamentary
record concerning the Extradition Act, alongside a faultlessly
conventional statutory interpretation of the IRPA, wove together a
powerful undergirding for what seemed to be a counterintuitive
conclusion: that a major pillar of Canada’s international law obligations
regarding refugee protection was actually implemented through a statute
that was otherwise geared towards a completely different set of
international legal obligations. While I have not inspected the court file,
there would be little doubt that his analysis was aided by the submissions
of the Crown on this point, and indeed at various points Cromwell J.
indicated he was accepting the core of the Crown’s argument. However,
as anyone who has appeared before Cromwell J. knows, he will have
taken what might have been a jewel of an argument and polished it so
brightly that even its original author would be surprised.
Second, Cromwell J.’s use of international legal sources outside the
treaties themselves strengthened the analysis significantly. While this is
not necessarily an unusual practice for the Court, what distinguishes
Cromwell J.’s analysis in Németh is that the sources were used in an
appropriately legal fashion, i.e., not just to establish “context” by
scattering references to tangentially relevant instruments, but using
carefully selected commentary and interpretative authorities as a means
of homing in on the content and scope of the particular international
norms in question. In Peracomo, for example, he made reference to the
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travaux préparatoires of the relevant treaty (the Convention on
Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 197657) as a means of
determining both the object and purpose of the treaty itself58 and the
intended interaction of two of its articles.59 In Németh, towards
establishing the centrality of non-refoulement within the overall refugee
law and interpreting its parameters, he relied upon work published by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,60 as well as the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.61 Similarly, the judgments in both
Peracomo and Thibodeau relied on extensive citation of the specialized
literature in the fields of maritime liability and carriage of goods by air,
respectively.62 Even the case law of foreign states, often used by the
Court as a loose means of helping to determine the policy rationalia of
statutes, was used in all three of these cases as evidence of state practice
under the relevant treaties. This was, if anything, a more important
interpretive source in both Peracomo and Thibodeau, as the British and
American high courts had much more extensive experience with
interpreting the instruments in question.63
All of this is consistent with the Court’s previous willingness to use
the rules contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties64 as
tools for interpretation, in particular Article 32 concerning supplementary
means of interpretation.65 For that matter, Cromwell J. himself explicitly
invoked the Vienna Convention at the outset of his analysis of the
relevant treaty provisions in Thibodeau;66 one would prefer that this was
done at the beginning of every such analysis but this is a minor quibble.
The point is not the simple fact that this approach was taken, given that it
reflects previous case law, but rather the skill and precision with which it
was employed. This is also useful advice for the lower courts, in
recognition that international law interpretation does not begin and end
with the text of the treaties.
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The third point is that in the legislative interpretation choices that
Cromwell J. made, he demonstrated what anyone familiar with his work
recognizes as a sort of trade mark: the law should be interpreted with an
eye to what is the doctrinally correct position but concurrently with what
will create administrative expediency and efficiency, at least as much as
possible in the circumstances. The tilt of the judgment in Németh is to
give primary effect to the international law rule, but in a manner that
ensures decision-making based on the rule will proceed in a sensible
fashion. Justice Cromwell used the international law norms in question to
create the appropriate inquiry — the question in a case like Németh is not
whether the person does or does not have refugee status under Canada’s
domestic refugee law, but rather whether that person will face
persecution if extradited. The practical effect of this choice is that there is
no need to preface the extradition inquiry with an additional inquiry into
whether or not the individual still requires refugee protection, since the
entire inquiry can be handled by the Minister of Justice (though by way
of actively consulting the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).67
Yet fairness, too, permeates the reasoning. While it is perhaps fairest to
the state (and, ultimately, the taxpayers) to streamline the administrative
proceedings as described here, it was clear that the protective impact of
non-refoulement upon the rights of bona fide refugees needed to be
underscored within the extradition proceedings. How best to ensure
protection of the refugee in this circumstance? Exactly the result one might
expect from a former teacher of evidence and civil procedure: enact a
presumption that an individual currently enjoying refugee status continues
to attract the protection, and shift the burden of proof to the party (here the
Crown) seeking to disrupt that situation.
While these two points are quite particular to Németh, the other two
decisions also demonstrate a commitment on Cromwell J.’s part to
fairness and policy expedience. Each involved Canada’s commitment to
its treaty obligations specifically within the context of heavily regulated
industries with worldwide scope, and in which overall international
consensus is important. In each, the evidence of the international
consensus is laid out in a deliberate and thorough manner. It is implicit,
then, that Cromwell J. sees the underlying goal of an analytical
methodology which steers Canada towards interpreting statutes in such a
way as to robustly embrace the international consensus: putting Canada
out of step in such areas would create economic and legal disruption.
67

Németh, supra, note 4, at para. 114.
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Rather than resorting to the tropes of nationalism, exceptionalism or even
Parliamentary supremacy, the Cromwellian view is to embrace
Parliament’s obvious desire to stimulate Canada’s engagement with its
treaty partner states, and promote a multilateral world in which Canada’s
interests are cooperatively maximized.

V. CONCLUSION
As this essay has tried to show, one good way of summing up
Cromwell J.’s approach to international law would be the phrase
“methodology matters”. While there may be room to quibble with
emphasis, interpretation or sources,68 Cromwell J.’s treaty decisions, and
particularly Németh, provide strong markers of progress in the Supreme
Court’s continuing wrestling match with public international law and the
delicate and frustrating exercise of ascertaining the contours of its
incorporation. Like the man himself, they have rigour, solid methodology
and good common sense.

68
Indeed, one commentator feels that the Court’s methodology went awry in Németh: see
Catherine Dauvergne, “How the Charter Has Failed Non-Citizens in Canada: Reviewing Thirty
Years of Supreme Court of Canada Jurisprudence” (2013) 58 McGill L.J. 663, at paras. 75-78.

